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“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the Supreme Court, and
Lawrence the “Laggard”
AUDREY K. HAGEDORN*
“If you’re a homophobe, we won’t ask and you don’t tell.”
– John K. Jacobs, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, December 20, 2010
______________________________
INTRODUCTION
September 20, 2011, officially marked the end of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
(DADT),1 the longstanding ban on gays and lesbians serving openly in the
military.2 Congress and President Obama had successfully pushed through a
last-minute repeal effort in the final hours of the 2010 congressional session,3 and
nearly nine months later, the repeal formally went into effect.4
After a quiet beginning, President Obama finally made good on one of the many
promises he made in an open letter to gay Americans written during his 2008
presidential campaign.5 For the first time in U.S. military history since World War
II, the military would no longer be able to actively exclude openly gay and lesbian
service members.6 The President, congressional Democrats, and gay rights activists
heralded the repeal of DADT as a “victory,” and as activists celebrated outside the
Capitol Building, it was clear that the end of DADT marked an important step in
the gay rights movement.7 Open access to the military was one of the last

* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Special thanks to
Professor Luis Fuentes-Rohwer for his helpful comments and guidance on many drafts and
to the staff of the Indiana Law Journal for their work throughout the editing process.
1. Ed O’Keefe, ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Ends in Quiet, Personal Ways, WASH. POST,
Sept. 20, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dont-ask-dont-tell-ends-in-quietpersonal-ways/2011/09/20/gIQAn69uiK_story.html.
2. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006).
3. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515; see
also Carl Hulse, Senate Ends Military Ban on Gays Serving Openly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
2010, at A1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Away ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/us/politics/23military.html.
4. Under section 2, the Repeal Act did not immediately take effect until sixty days after
the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
certified that the military was ready for the change to occur. 124 Stat. at 3515–16. That
certification did not take place until July 22, 2011, marking September 20, 2011, as the
official end date to DADT. Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Ends ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2011, at A13.
5. Barack Obama’s Letter to the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Community,
GAY RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 28, 2008, 11:44 PM) [hereinafter Open Letter],
http://www.gayrightswatch.com/2008/ 02/barack-obamas-letter-to-gay-lesbian.html.
6. George Chauncey, Op-Ed., Last Ban Standing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010, at A35
(describing the ban on open service in the military as “a crucial issue for the gay movement
for 65 years” following the end of World War II).
7. Hulse, supra note 3, at A1.
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remaining areas of American life that was legally off-limits to gay Americans.8
Now gay and lesbian service members could serve openly and proudly.
Massachusetts House Representative Barney Frank summed up the momentous
occasion: “If you can fight for your country, you can do anything.”9
To the less scrutinizing eye, the legislative repeal of DADT represents a
successful end to a very long struggle. But, in reality, the fall of DADT stands for
relatively limited progress in the gay rights arena. That progress is narrow because
DADT was the subject of criticism from the moment Congress enacted it nearly
eighteen years ago during the Clinton administration.10 Purporting to be a
“live-and-let-live” policy, DADT supposedly “distinguished between ‘being gay’
and ‘acting on being gay.’”11 In practice, however, DADT was merely a
codification of the existing military policy—a “de facto ban” on gays in the
military12—and gay rights activists quickly challenged the law.13 Despite the
immediate opposition, over seventeen years elapsed before any judicial challenge
culminated in a decision striking down DADT.14 These challenges came in the fall
of 2010.
In Witt v. Department of the Air Force15 and Log Cabin Republicans v. United
States,16 District Judges Ronald Leighton and Virginia Phillips, respectively, ruled
DADT unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds. Notably, Witt and Log
Cabin Republicans came just over a year after the Supreme Court declined the
chance to hear a constitutional challenge to DADT in Cook v. Gates.17 While Witt

8. David A. Fahrenthold, For Gay Rights, Is Repeal of ‘Don’t Ask’ Military Ban the
End or the Beginning?, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/12/19/AR2010121903719.html.
9. Stolberg, supra note 3.
10. See Sharon E. Debbage Alexander, A Ban by Any Other Name: Ten Years of “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell,” 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 403, 408–10 (2004) (“The public understood
[DADT] to be a ‘live-and-let-live’ rule, and in the minds of many involved . . . that was
indeed the intent of the law. However, in practice the new policy turned out to be anything
but a laizzez-faire approach to sexual orientation in the military.” (emphasis in original)); see
also Emily B. Hecht, Debating the Ban: The Past, Present and Future of Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell, N.J. LAW, June 2007, at 46 (“In practice, . . . what was supposed to be a kinder, gentler
policy toward gays in the military has proven to be no different than prior regulations . . . .”).
11. Alexander, supra note 10, at 410.
12. Robert I. Correales, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: A Dying Policy on the Precipice, 44
CAL. W. L. REV. 413, 414 (2008).
13. See, e.g., Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997);
Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996); Abel v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d
Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996).
14. See Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Log
Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
15. Witt, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308, on remand from 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008). Judge
Leighton’s decision invalidating DADT utilized a three-part test announced by the Ninth
Circuit in 2008. See infra notes 115–26 and accompanying text.
16. Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884.
17. 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. Pietrangelo v. Gates, 129 S. Ct.
2763 (2009); see also William Branigin, Supreme Court Turns Down ‘Don’t Ask’ Challenge,
June
8,
2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
WASH. POST,
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and Log Cabin Republicans generated the congressional, presidential, military, and
public discourse that ultimately lead to the legislative repeal of DADT in late 2010,
the issues raised and the questions asked in 2010 were no different from those
raised and asked in Cook v. Gates in 2009.
In fact, Lawrence v. Texas, the landmark Supreme Court decision invalidating a
Texas law criminalizing sodomy,18 opened the door to DADT’s repeal as early as
2004. Interestingly, however, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the only
DADT challenge presented to it after 2004.19 Indeed, the Court has refused to utter
a single word regarding Lawrence’s reach in any context since 2003. This silence
has not been for want of opportunities; rather, the Court has had several chances to
clarify Lawrence’s reach.20 It has not done so. The Court’s silence has been
particularly frustrating for proponents of gay rights because Lawrence potentially
holds the key to full constitutional respect for gay Americans and equal protection
under the law.21 This respect and equality arguably includes same-sex marriage.
Without knowing what Lawrence protects, it becomes difficult for the gay rights
movement to gain momentum through the judicial branch.
In 2009, the stage was set for an answer to the central questions surrounding
Lawrence. Cook v. Gates gave the Supreme Court a second chance to strike down
DADT once and for all, and more importantly, give gay rights activists a significant
tool to push onward with judicial challenges to prohibitions on same-sex marriage.
Instead, the Supreme Court decided not to decide.
This Note uses the story of DADT to argue that the Supreme Court has been
strategically side-stepping Lawrence v. Texas since 2003. Specifically, this Note
argues that the Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari to Cook v. Gates in
2009 was based in part on strategic considerations. The Court, conservative at the
time, did not want to vote its sincere policy preferences. More importantly,
however, the Court did not want to revisit Lawrence v. Texas so soon or move
forward with its substantive due process jurisprudence in the context of gay rights.
Unfortunately for gay rights activists, the Court’s decision has kept lower courts in
the dark. In 2009, the Supreme Court took one look at the surrounding political
climate and passed on DADT. This Note attempts to explain why. By
understanding the Court’s decision to deny certiorari to Cook as a strategic choice,
this Note offers a different perspective on the fall of DADT, Lawrence v. Texas,
and the future of the gay rights movement in the judiciary.

article/2009/06/08/AR2009060801368.html.
18. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
19. See Cook, 528 F.3d 42, cert. denied sub nom. Pietrangelo, 129 S. Ct. 2763.
20. See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir.) (applying Lawrence to a
Wisconsin statute criminalizing incest), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 988 (2005); Williams v. Att’y
Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236–38 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying Lawrence to Alabama
statute prohibiting commercial distribution of sex toys), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005);
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir.
2004) (applying Lawrence to a Florida law prohibiting gay adoption), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
1081 (2005).
21. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare
Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1945–51 (2004) (arguing that “the underlying
theory and most important passages of Lawrence suggest ready . . . applicability of the
holding to same-sex marriage”).
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The argument proceeds in three steps. Part I chronicles the history of the Court’s
substantive due process analysis in the context of gay rights and includes an
in-depth discussion of the landmark decision Lawrence v. Texas. Part II discusses
the strategies employed by the Supreme Court to avoid controversial issues and
applies this explanation of judicial behavior to DADT. Part III concludes by
considering the consequences of the Court’s behavior and what the legislative
repeal of DADT may mean for the future success of the gay rights movement in the
judiciary.
I. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND ONE PATH TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
This Part details the history of the Court’s substantive due process analysis in
the context of gay rights, focusing on the Supreme Court’s landmark decision
Lawrence v. Texas and its aftermath. After reviewing the Supreme Court’s
substantive due process approach to cases dealing with gay rights prior to
Lawrence, the discussion turns to the Court’s decision in Lawrence and offers an
explanation of the majority opinion. The final two sections in this Part pay
significant attention to the response to Lawrence—from both the outside legal
community and from within the appellate courts system.
A. Pre-Lawrence Substantive Due Process
The idea of substantive due process, or “what it means for the state to deprive
someone of ‘liberty’ without ‘due process of law’ in the substantive sense,”22 has
been debated by courts since its inception.23 Adopted to protect the rights of freed
slaves,24 today the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has grown to
embody a fundamental right to autonomy. This autonomy includes such rights as
the right to contraception,25 the right to procreate,26 and the right to abortion.27 The
basic idea is that substantive due process protects those “fundamental rights” which
are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”28 or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition.”29 Courts strive to protect these fundamental rights. Any law

22. Id. at 1897.
23. Jason A. Crook, Exposing the Contradiction: An Originalist’s Approach to
Understanding Why Substantive Due Process Is a Constitutional Misinterpretation, 10 NEV.
L.J. 1, 1–2 (2009) (“Few phrases in American jurisprudence have created more of a stir or
inspired greater controversy than the seventeen words that comprise the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . In light of its linguistic incongruity and the versatility of
its judicial precedents, one could fairly state that the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause has been the subject of passionate debate and varying
interpretation ever since its ratification in 1868.”).
24. Id. at 2.
25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
26. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
27. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
28. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citing Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
29. Id. at 721 (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
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that infringes upon a fundamental right is subject to strict scrutiny, which requires
the government to put forth “an interest sufficiently compelling to place within the
realm of the reasonable a refusal to recognize the individual right.”30 If a law does
not implicate strict scrutiny, courts may apply either rational basis review31 or
intermediate scrutiny.32 Under rational basis review, a challenged law must only
further some legitimate goal in order to pass judicial review.33 Intermediate scrutiny
lies somewhere between rational basis review and strict scrutiny.34
The Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence in the context of gay rights
has been limited. Prior to Lawrence, the Supreme Court engaged in a long pattern
of avoiding cases dealing with gay rights.35 Most of the time the Court would
simply deny certiorari to any case dealing with gay rights.36 H. W. Perry’s study of
the Court’s agenda setting lends credence to this point.37 His findings indicate that
gay rights jurisprudence was one area of law that the Court consistently avoided.38
In fact, from 1967 to 1984, the Court did not hear oral arguments in any case
dealing with gay rights.39 When the Court did hear a case, it usually chose to affirm
a harsh lower court decision.40 According to Professor Christopher Leslie, the
Court’s behavior was illustrative of a “collective decision to avoid the controversial
issue of gay rights.”41 Bowers v. Hardwick,42 the crucial substantive due process
case in the context of gay rights prior to Lawrence, was an anomaly.
In Bowers, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Georgia law
criminalizing sodomy between two consenting adults.43 Justice White took
considerable pains to frame the legal issue at stake narrowly. Instead of looking at

30. Id. at 766–67 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
31. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–34 (1996).
33. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955)
(holding that a law need not even be “logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional”).
34. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531–34.
35. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Importance of Lawrence in the Context of the
Supreme Court’s Historical Treatment of Gay Litigants, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 189, 191
(2005) (“Before Lawrence, gay victims of legal injustice generally did not receive relief in
the Supreme Court. . . . The Court was a place where advocates of gay rights would seek
relief but be denied . . . .”).
36. See id. at 207–14.
37. H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 254–59 (1991).
38. See id.
39. Leslie, supra note 35, at 210.
40. See, e.g., Boutilier v. INS, 363 F.2d 488, 495–96 (2d Cir. 1966), aff’d, 387 U.S. 118,
120–24 (1967) (holding alien’s admission of homosexual activities prior to entry into the
United States was sufficient evidence of “psychopathic personality” to justify deportation);
Doe v. Commonwealth’s Att’y for City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 (E.D. Va.
1975) (holding that Virginia’s sodomy law did not violate any constitutional right to
privacy), aff’d, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
41. Leslie, supra note 35, at 209.
42. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
43. Id. at 186.
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the broader issue of whether a fundamental right to private sexual intimacy exists,
White “callously mischaracterized”44 the issue as whether a fundamental right
existed for “homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”45 White and the Court answered in
the negative, holding that “to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”46 The Court then applied rational basis review and
upheld the Georgia law.47 Given the Court’s use of rational basis in Bowers, any
law regulating private conduct between same-sex couples was likely to be upheld.48
This was certainly the case for DADT.
Following Bowers, lower courts repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of
DADT in a string of cases that arose after its enactment in 1993.49 For example, in
Richenberg v. Perry, the Eighth Circuit dismissed a substantive due process
challenge to DADT after determining that DADT rationally addressed the
military’s purpose of reducing “sexual tensions” that might “jeopardize unit
cohesion.”50 In addition to the general deference that rational basis review
requires,51 the majority of these courts were especially deferential to the military
and its argument that the presence of gays in the military harmed its ability to
provide national defense.52 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that it was “difficult to
conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts [had] less
competence.”53 Indeed, the Supreme Court had long granted deference to the
military,54 which is presumably why the Court declined to grant certiorari to any of

44. Correales, supra note 12, at 434. By framing the issue this way, the Bowers majority
effectively evaded the issue of “decisional privacy” and simultaneously cast a shadow of
immorality upon homosexuality in general. Id. at 434–36 (“The majority’s negative
characterization of the issue before the Court and its aggressive moral condemnation of gay
relationships created an ever-widening shadow from which it became nearly impossible to
escape.”).
45. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
46. Id. at 194.
47. Id. at 196.
48. Rational basis review is highly deferential; legislation must only be “rationally
related” to some legitimate state interest in order to pass judicial scrutiny. See City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule is that
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”); see also supra text accompanying
note 33.
49. See, e.g., Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997);
Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d. 256, 261 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915,
934 (4th Cir. 1996).
50. 97 F.3d at 262.
51. See supra note 48.
52. See Correales, supra note 12, at 414 (arguing that the most successful argument
cited in favor of DADT was the belief of a few military leaders that DADT protected the
“sensibilities of a small group of heterosexuals” who felt threatened by gays and lesbians
serving openly in the military).
53. Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 261 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)).
54. See e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) (“[T]he Constitution
contemplate[s] that the Legislative Brach have plenary control over rights, duties, and
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these early cases. The 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, however, seemed to
change everything.
B. Lawrence v. Texas
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas law that
criminalized sodomy, overruling Bowers v. Hardwick.55 Criticizing “the Court’s
failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake” in Bowers,56 Justice Kennedy
reframed the issue before the Court as whether two consenting gay adults had the
liberty to engage in private sexual conduct under the Due Process Clause.57 Justice
Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
held that they did. The Court reasoned that “[homosexuals’] right to liberty under
the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in [homosexual] conduct
without intervention of the government” and that Texas’s law “furthered no
legitimate state interest which could justify its intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual.”58 Further, the Court rejected morality as a legitimate
state interest: “[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
law prohibiting the practice.”59 In his dissent Justice Scalia criticized the majority
for not adhering to stare decisis, pointing out that “nowhere does the Court’s
opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a ‘fundamental right’ under the Due
Process Clause.”60
Perhaps Justice Scalia was right to point out the Court’s omission. The Court
was curiously silent about the level of scrutiny it was applying.61 The words
“fundamental right” did not appear in the opinion,62 and the Court did not employ
the traditional approach to substantive due process questions implicating
fundamental rights.63 This approach first defines a right as fundamental and then
responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment . . . .”); Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (“[J]udicial deference . . . is at its apogee when legislative action
under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations
for their governance is challenged.”).
55. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
56. Id. at 567. In reframing the issue, Justice Kennedy broadened the liberty at stake to
encompass not only a particular kind of sexual conduct but all sexual behavior in the home.
Id. (“To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct
demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were
it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws involved
in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a
particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching
consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the
most private of places, the home.”).
57. Id. at 564.
58. Id. at 578.
59. Id. at 577–78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
60. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. See Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1116 (2004).
62. See Lawrence, 339 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. See Hunter, supra note 61, at 1116 (“By asking the question of whether the
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considers whether the government’s interest is compelling enough to override that
right.64 Rather, the Court held that Texas’s law was an impermissible intrusion on
an individual’s autonomy absent a more legitimate reason than promoting
morality.65 Was the Court applying rational basis to strike down the law prohibiting
sodomy or was it using a form of heightened scrutiny to protect some “private
sexual intimacy” for conduct between same-sex couples?
While Justice Scalia characterized the decision as “an unheard-of form of
rational-basis review that will have far-reaching implications,”66 it is unlikely that
the Court used rational basis review in Lawrence. Rather, the majority’s standard of
review most likely took some form of heightened scrutiny. First, the Supreme
Court overruled the Texas statute. This fact alone is significant because rational
basis review “will almost never lead to the invalidation of a state law.”67
Admittedly, the Court never explicitly recognized the standard of review it was
using to strike down the Texas law. However, the outcome in a case can be more
indicative than what the words in the opinion say. The process of announcing a
standard of review “is often more conclusory than informative” and is actually only
an “occasional practice” that is used by the Court.68 Importantly, Professor
Laurence Tribe suggests that characterizing the test in Lawrence as rational basis
“requires overlooking passage after passage in which the Court’s opinion indeed
invoked the talismanic verbal formula of substantive due process.”69 Indeed, the
Court looked to all the precedents which comprise the heart of the substantive due
process right to make autonomous decisions—Griswold,70 Roe,71 and Casey.72 If
Lawrence was analogous to these seminal decisions, the protected liberty interest
was at least related to individual autonomy in some way.
In sum, the Court’s approach in Lawrence arguably added the fundamental right
to private sexual intimacy to the list of protected substantive due process rights by
recognizing that “the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct
extends beyond the marital relationship.”73 If true, the decision in Lawrence
governmental action had a legitimate basis first, and concluding that it did not, the Court did
not need to then ask whether the individual was seeking to exercise a fundamental
right . . . .”).
64. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (“Our
established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we
have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental
rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’ Second, we have required in
substantive-due-process cases a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest.” (citations omitted)).
65. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–79.
66. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. Hunter, supra note 61, at 1113. See generally supra text accompanying note 33.
68. Tribe, supra note 21, at 1916–17.
69. Id. at 1917.
70. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–65 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965)).
71. Id. at 565 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
72. Id. at 573–74 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
73. Id. at 565.
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invalidated any statute that interferes with private consensual sexual conduct
between anyone—gay or straight. DADT, which explicitly banned homosexual
conduct in the military,74 fell squarely into this category. There is no question that
Lawrence demanded more than Bowers. But would Lawrence have “far-reaching
implications” in the larger fight for gay rights?
C. The Brown v. Board of Education of the Gay Rights Movement?
Professor Laurence Tribe, the losing attorney in Bowers,75 suggested that
“Lawrence may well be remembered as the Brown v. Board of gay and lesbian
America.”76 Given that Brown v. Board of Education77 is arguably the most
celebrated decision in Supreme Court history, Professor Tribe paid Lawrence no
small compliment. Like Brown, some Americans hoped that the “sweeping”
language of Lawrence would stand for “constitutional liberty for gay men and
lesbians.”78 Professor Christopher Leslie hailed the Supreme Court as “an
institution where gay Americans can seek justice,”79 noting that the decision had
“change[d] the entire relationship between gay Americans and their Supreme
Court.”80 With Lawrence, many scholars believed that the Court had removed from
states the ability to discriminate against gay Americans in a variety of contexts—
“including employment, child custody, and immigration.”81 Most significantly, the
decision in Lawrence was both celebrated by gay rights activists and feared by
social conservatives to be a powerful weapon in the battle to legalize same-sex
marriage.82
Professor Lisa Parshall argued, however, that Justice Kennedy’s opinion
“undercut Lawrence as a foundation for gay marriage by indicating that the ruling
did not require formal recognition of homosexual relations by the state.”83 It is true

74. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (2006) (providing that a member of the armed forces can
be separated if there is a finding that “the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or
solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts”).
75. See Martin A. Schwartz, Lawrence v. Texas: The Decision and Its Implications for
the Future, 20 TOURO L. REV. 221, 232 (2004).
76. Tribe, supra note 21, at 1895.
77. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Homosexual Rights; Justices, 6–3, Legalize
Gay Sexual Conduct in Sweeping Reversal of Court’s ’86 Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2003, at A1.
79. Leslie, supra note 35, at 219.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 189; see also Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted
by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000) (arguing that the
existence of state sodomy laws branded gay men and lesbians as criminals in other contexts,
such as gay adoption, and limited their rights and defenses in those areas).
82. See, e.g., Sarah Kershaw, Adversaries on Gay Rights Vow State-by-State Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/06/us/adversaries-on-gay-rights-vowstate-by-state-fight.html?src=pm. For a good discussion of both the liberal and conservative
response to Lawrence, see Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (And Goodridge), 104
MICH. L. REV. 431, 459–73 (2005).
83. Lisa K. Parshall, Redefining Due Process Analysis: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
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that the Court shied away from ruling on the alternate Equal Protection challenge in
Lawrence.84 Justice Kennedy directly stated that Lawrence did “not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.”85 But Parshall concedes that “[i]n some ways,
Justice Kennedy has carefully laid the foundation for the recognition of gay
marriage by granting protection to homosexual conduct and rejecting moral
opprobrium as a legitimate basis for the disparate treatment of lesbians and gays.”86
By renouncing morality as a legitimate state interest and adopting Justice Stevens’s
dissent in Bowers,87 Justice Kennedy had dealt a heavy blow to the morality
argument against same-sex marriage.88
In fact, just five months after Lawrence the Massachusetts Supreme Court
handed down Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,89 making Massachusetts
the first state to legalize same-sex marriage.90 The Massachusetts court wrote:
[In Lawrence], the Court affirmed that the core concept of common
human dignity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution precludes government intrusion into the deeply
personal realms of consensual adult expressions of intimacy and one’s
choice of an intimate partner. . . .
Barred access to the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil
marriage, a person who enters into an intimate, exclusive union with
another of the same sex is arbitrarily deprived of membership in one of
our community’s most rewarding and cherished institutions. That
exclusion is incompatible with the constitutional principles of respect
for individual autonomy and equality under law.91
Confirming both liberal and conservative predictions,92 the language in Goodridge
echoed the broad liberty interest described in Lawrence. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court would not be the only state court to use Lawrence as a tool to

and the Concept of Emergent Rights, 69 ALB. L. REV. 237, 263 (2005).
84. See Arthur S. Leonard, Exorcising the Ghosts of Bowers v. Hardwick: Uprooting
Invalid Precedents, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 519, 524 (2009). Although it declined to consider
the Equal Protection argument, the Court admitted that the argument was “tenable.”
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574–75 (2003). Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, in fact,
made that argument. Id. at 579–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Leonard, supra.
85. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
86. Parshall, supra note 83, at 263–64.
87. See supra text accompanying note 59.
88. See Leonard, supra note 84, at 545–46.
89. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). Interestingly, Massachusetts was both the first state to
legalize same-sex marriage and the state with the lowest divorce rate in the country. This fact
remained unchanged even after five years of permitting same-sex marriage. Bruce Wilson,
After 5 Years of Legal Gay Marriage, Massachusetts Still Has the Lowest State Divorce Rate
and Western Civilization Is Intact, ALTERNET BLOG (Aug. 24, 2009, 6:18 AM),
http://www.alternet.org/blogs/.
90. Pam Belluck, Same-Sex Marriage: The Overview; Hundreds of Same-Sex Couples
Wed in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A1.
91. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948–49.
92. See text accompanying note 82.
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legalize same-sex marriage. The highest courts in California,93 Connecticut,94 and
Iowa95 subsequently followed suit, each citing to Lawrence in opinions legalizing
same-sex marriages.
The decision in Lawrence also renewed efforts to end DADT. Immediately after
the Court announced Lawrence in 2003, gay rights activists believed that the
judicial repeal of DADT was within reach.96 As early as the spring of 2004, the
elimination of DADT was not a question of if, but rather, a question of when and
how.97 However, critics soon characterized the opinion as “heavier on rhetoric than
on clarity,”98 and some scholars hesitated to agree that Lawrence protected a
fundamental right to private sexual intimacy.99 Others, like Professor Nan Hunter,
argued that Lawrence was intentionally vague—both broad and flexible—and
meant to allow lower courts to determine its future.100 It turns out that Hunter’s
argument was not far off: interpreting Lawrence is exactly what lower courts have
been struggling with for the past eight years.
D. The Circuits Respond to Lawrence
Because of the Court’s muddled analysis, lower courts have hesitated to
embrace the heightened protection provided by Lawrence.101 Generally courts have
erred on the conservative side and held that Lawrence does not recognize a
fundamental right to private sexual intimacy.102 This conservative approach has, to

93. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). In re Marriage Cases was
superseded by California constitutional amendment. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal.
2009).
94. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
95. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). For further discussion of state court
decisions on the issue of same-sex marriage, see generally Chase D. Anderson, Note, A
Quest for Fair and Balanced: The Supreme Court, State Courts, and the Future of Same-Sex
Marriage Review After Perry, 60 DUKE L.J. 1413 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court
has approached cases dealing with sexual orientation using a “principle of neutrality”).
96. See, e.g., Gay Man, Citing Supreme Court Ruling, Fights ’97 Army Discharge, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2003, at A14. On July 8, 2003, just twelve days after the Supreme Court
handed down Lawrence, a man filed a court challenge to DADT. Id.
97. See Alexander, supra note 10, at 434.
98. Hunter, supra note 61, at 1103.
99. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 75, at 227.
100. Hunter, supra note 61, at 1139 (“Perhaps the most significant point to bear in mind
is that the function of lower federal courts, scholars, and practitioners now will be not so
much to find the meaning of Lawrence as to create it.”).
101. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 816
(11th Cir. 2004) (“We are particularly hesitant to infer a new fundamental liberty interest
from an opinion whose language and reasoning are inconsistent with standard fundamental–
rights analysis.”).
102. See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Lawrence . . . did not
announce . . . a fundamental right, protected by the Constitution, for adults to engage in all
manner of consensual sexual conduct . . . .”); Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817; see also Stephanie
Francis Ward, Avoiding Lawrence: Courts Considering Last Year’s Major Gay Rights
Ruling Are Treading Carefully, 90 A.B.A. J. 16, 16 (2004).
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a certain extent, minimized the holding in Lawrence.103 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has remained noticeably absent from Lawrence’s progeny. As a result, lower
courts have slowly been able to reduce Lawrence’s impact. Two cases coming from
the Eleventh Circuit serve as good examples.
In Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services, the
Eleventh Circuit considered a Florida statute that prohibited gay adoption.104 The
statute applied to “homosexual[s],” which the court described as “applicants who
are known to engage in current, voluntary homosexual activity.”105 The plaintiffs
alleged that the statute, which regulated conduct, burdened the fundamental right
recognized by the Court in Lawrence.106 The Eleventh Circuit, specifically focusing
on the Supreme Court’s lack of a formal analysis in Lawrence, concluded that “it
[was] a strained and ultimately incorrect reading of Lawrence to interpret it to
announce a new fundamental right” and upheld the Florida statute after applying
rational basis review.107 Shortly after Lofton, in Williams v. Attorney General of
Alabama,108 the Eleventh Circuit faced another Lawrence question. Williams dealt
with an Alabama statute that prohibited the sale of “sex toys.”109 Again, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that Lawrence did not recognize a fundamental right to
sexual privacy and upheld the Alabama law.110
The plaintiffs in both Lofton and Williams petitioned the Supreme Court for
review; it promptly denied certiorari to both in 2005.111 Although a Florida
appellate court recently declared the adoption statute in Lofton unconstitutional and
the issue is now moot,112 the Supreme Court’s decision to avoid the issue of gay
adoption in 2005 implicitly indicated that the Court was not willing to return to
Lawrence so quickly. The same seemed true for the evaded sex toy issue in
Williams. Perhaps the Eleventh Circuit was correct to interpret Lawrence as a
narrow decision. This interpretation seems unlikely given the powerful language in
Justice Kennedy’s opinion.113 However, because the Supreme Court refused to

103. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 102, at 16 (reporting that many plaintiffs’ lawyers feared
that courts were “backing away from Lawrence too quickly”).
104. 358 F.3d at 806–07.
105. Id. at 807 (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210,
1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
106. Id. at 815.
107. Id. at 817.
108. 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
109. Id. at 1233. The Alabama statute, technically still in effect, disallows “any person to
knowingly distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute any
obscene material or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation
of human genital organs for anything of pecuniary value.” ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1)
(LexisNexis 2005). First-time offenders face a $10,000 fine and prison time. Id.
110. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1250 (“[W]e reject the ACLU’s request that we redefine the
constitutional right to privacy to cover the commercial distribution of sex toys.”).
111. Lofton, 358 F.3d 804, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005); Williams, 378 F.3d 1232,
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005).
112. See In re Matter of Adoption of X.X.G. and N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2010); see also Editorial, Victory for Families, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at A22.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 57–60.
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affirm whether the Eleventh Circuit correctly interpreted the meaning of Lawrence,
lower courts still could not be sure of the nature and extent of its reach.
After the Eleventh Circuit’s failure to vigorously apply Lawrence, challenges to
DADT provided appellate courts with another opportunity to consider Lawrence.
This time, courts were less conservative in their approach, and their opinions truly
challenged the Court on Lawrence for the first time.114
In 2008, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to hand down
a post-Lawrence decision relating to DADT. In Witt v. Department of the Air
Force, the Ninth Circuit considered the due process claim of Major Margaret Witt,
an Air Force combat flight nurse who was discharged after the military accused her
of living with a woman.115 Major Witt argued that Lawrence “establish[ed] a
fundamental right to engage in adult consensual sexual acts.”116 The Ninth Circuit
was less inclined than previous courts to apply the rubber stamp of rational basis to
Witt’s claim; instead, it concluded that “Lawrence requires something more than
traditional rational basis review . . . .”117
The Ninth Circuit determined that neither rational basis review nor strict
scrutiny was consistent with Lawrence.118 Instead, the court looked to Sell v. United
States119 for guidance. Sell was a Supreme Court case from 2003 in which the
Court applied a heightened level of scrutiny.120 Sell was, in the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion, an expansion of Lawrence.121 In Sell, the Supreme Court considered
whether the government can forcibly administer anti-psychotic drugs to a
mentally-ill defendant in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial.122
The Court held that the government is permitted to do so, but only if (1) there were
important governmental interests at stake; (2) the involuntary medication would
significantly further those interests; (3) the involuntary medication was actually
necessary to further those interests; and (4) the administration of the drugs is
medically appropriate.123
The Ninth Circuit adapted the first three prongs of the Sell test into a
“heightened scrutiny balancing analysis”:
[W]hen the government attempts to intrude upon the personal and
private lives of homosexuals, in a manner that implicates the rights
identified in Lawrence, the government must advance an important

114. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are persuaded that
Lawrence did indeed recognize a protected liberty interest for adults to engage in private,
consensual sexual intimacy . . . .”); Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 816 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“We cannot reconcile what the Supreme Court did in Lawrence with the minimal
protections afforded by traditional rational basis review.”).
115. 527 F.3d at 810.
116. Id. at 813.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 816–18.
119. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
120. See id. at 179–83.
121. See Witt, 527 F.3d at 818.
122. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177.
123. Id. at 179–81.
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governmental interest, the intrusion must significantly further that
interest, and the intrusion must be necessary to further that interest.124
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the trial court for factual determinations.125
Unfortunately, Witt was not at a point procedurally where the Supreme Court could
easily accept review in 2009.126
Shortly after the decision in Witt, however, the First Circuit handed down a
decision upholding the constitutionality of DADT in Cook v. Gates.127 Like the
plaintiff in Witt, twelve former military members claimed that DADT violated their
constitutional right to due process under Lawrence.128 The First Circuit agreed with
the Ninth Circuit that Lawrence required some level of intermediate scrutiny
protection to engage in private sexual intimacy.129 The court gave four reasons: (1)
Lawrence relied on due process cases related to sexual intimacy; (2) the language
in Lawrence suggested a protected liberty interest; (3) Lawrence relied on Justice
Stevens’s dissent in Bowers; and (4) if Lawrence had employed rational basis, the
Court would not have struck down the Texas statute.130
However, the First Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s adaptation of the
Sell decision.131 According to the First Circuit, the Sell Court merely “applied a
standard of review less demanding than strict scrutiny” by asking if administering
the drugs was necessary to further important governmental interests.132 The First
Circuit saw Lawrence as employing a similar standard of review—one that
balanced the government’s interest in preventing the perceived immoral conduct

124. Witt, 527 F.3d at 819.
125. Id. at 821–22.
126. On remand and just prior to DADT’s legislative repeal, District Judge Ronald
Leighton ruled DADT unconstitutional by applying the Ninth Circuit’s test. See Witt v.
Dep’t of the Air Force, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1316 (W.D. Wash. 2010), on remand from
527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008). In Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, District Judge
Virginia Phillips also found DADT unconstitutional using the Ninth Circuit’s test. 716 F.
Supp. 2d 884, 929 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Earlier this year, Witt ended in settlement; the Air Force
agreed not to appeal the case, and Major Witt was reinstated. See Levi Pulkkinnen, Pentagon
Settles with McChord Major Fired for Being Lesbian, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, May
10, 2011, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Pentagon-settles-with-McChord-majorfired-for- 1373728.php. Conversely, Log Cabin Republicans pushed onward. On October 12,
2010, Judge Phillips issued a permanent injunction barring DADT’s enforcement worldwide.
Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 929. The Ninth Circuit stayed Phillips’s
injunction on October 20, 2010, however, pending an appeal by the Department of Justice.
Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No. 10-56634, 2010 WL 4136210 (9th Cir. Oct. 20,
2010). Log Cabin Republicans appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court,
but the Court declined to intervene. 131 S. Ct. 589 (2010). The Ninth Circuit ended up
reinstating Phillips’s order barring DADT’s enforcement on July 6, 2011, Log Cabin
Republicans v. United States, No. 10-56813, 2011 WL 2982102 (9th Cir. July 15, 2011),
until DADT officially expired on September 20, 2011. See O’Keefe, supra note 1.
127. 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).
128. Id. at 47.
129. Id. at 52–53.
130. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 67–73.
131. Cook, 528 F.3d at 60 n.10.
132. Id. at 55.
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and the degree of intrusion against an individual’s private sexual life.133 Unlike the
Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit afforded significant deference to Congress in
military affairs.134 After an extensive discussion of the Supreme Court’s deferential
history with Congress on military affairs, the First Circuit ultimately found
Congress’s finding that DADT “preserv[es] ‘high standards of morale, good order
and discipline, and unit cohesion’ in the military” to be conclusive.135
Witt and Cook were the first two Courts of Appeals to interpret Lawrence, the
liberty interest it recognized, and the standard of review it employed in the context
of DADT. However, the circuits were split in their approach.136 While the First
Circuit’s balancing approach to DADT recognized that Lawrence required
something more than heightened scrutiny, its application, like the Eleventh
Circuit’s, had minimized the liberty interest in Lawrence. Conversely, the Ninth
Circuit’s three-prong adaptation of Sell represented a direct challenge to the
Supreme Court on Lawrence. Because of this split, many believed the Court would
accept the case for review.137 On December 23, 2008, one of the plaintiffs in Cook,
James Pietrangelo, petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari. A little over six
months later, on June 8, 2009, the Supreme Court issued a memorandum decision
denying his request.138
In the summer of 2009, the stage was set for a Supreme Court decision on
DADT. In light of the sweeping language in Lawrence and the parallels between
Texas’s law prohibiting sodomy and DADT,139 the Supreme Court presumably
would not ignore the issue much longer. The American public finally seemed ready
to end the longstanding prohibition on homosexuals serving openly in the
military.140 Even military officials were receptive to seeing the end of the

133. Id. at 56.
134. Id. at 57 (“It is unquestionable that judicial deference to congressional
decision-making in the area of military affairs heavily influences the analysis and resolution
of constitutional challenges that arise in this context.”).
135. Id. at 59.
136. See, e.g., Cecily Walters, Circuits Split over Military’s ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’
Policy, TRIAL MAG., No. 44, Aug. 2008, at 65.
137. See id.
138. Cook, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. Pietrangelo v. Gates, 129
S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
139. Both the Texas law struck down in Lawrence and DADT focused on a particular
type of conduct. Specifically, Texas’s statute criminalized “deviate sexual intercourse,” TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2011), invalidated by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), which the Texas Penal code defined as “any contact between any part of the genitals
of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or the penetration of the genitals or
the anus of another person with an object.” Id. § 21.01(1). Similarly, DADT prohibited
members from “engag[ing] in, attempt[ing] to engage in, or solicit[ing] another to engage in
a homosexual act.” 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (2006). DADT defined homosexual acts as “any
bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same
sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires; and any bodily contact which a reasonable
person would understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in [a homosexual
act].” Id. § 654(f)(3)(A)–(B).
140. See Elisabeth Bumiller, In Military, New Debate Over Policy Toward Gays, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2009, at A14.
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discriminating policy.141 However, ignoring the issue is precisely the action the
Court chose to take. Why did the Court choose not to decide? Still the better
question is how could it not decide? When considered as a strategic choice, the
Supreme Court’s decision to pass on the DADT question in Cook in 2009 becomes
less overwhelming (and perhaps a little underwhelming).
II. A STRATEGIC COURT
Like all political actors, the Supreme Court acts strategically. The Court acts and
makes decisions based on the goals and likely actions of the other main branches.142
The denial of certiorari in Cook happened not long after a Democratic President
took office for the first time in eight years.143 Joined by a comfortable Democratic
majority in Congress,144 President Obama had already announced that abolishing
DADT was a priority.145 With a Democratic President and majority in Congress,
the Supreme Court faced three options: (1) grant certiorari in Cook, affirm the First
Circuit’s holding, and send a strong message of defiance to the new administration
and Congress; (2) grant certiorari in Cook, reverse the First Circuit’s holding, and
expand the holding in Lawrence; or (3) choose to send a different message—
silence.146
This Part first turns to an explanation of Professors Lee Epstein, Jack Knight,
and Andrew Martin’s strategic model of judicial behavior and then considers the
choice the Justices made regarding DADT.

141. A 2006 military study by Zogby International indicated that 73% of currently
serving military members were “comfortable” with gays and lesbians serving openly
alongside them. SAM RODGERS, ZOGBY INT’L, OPINIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ON SEXUAL
MINORITIES
IN
THE
MILITARY
20
(2006),
available
at
http://www.palmcenter.org/files/active/0/ZogbyReport.pdf.
142. See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a
Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 585 (2001).
143. See Adam Nagourney, Obama: Racial Barrier Falls in Decisive Victory, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A1.
144. See id.
145. See Open Letter, supra note 5.
146. See infra Figure 1 outlining these three options.

2012]

DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL

811

Figure 1: The Court’s Options in Cook
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Æ
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A. The Judicial Review Game
Over two hundred years ago, the Supreme Court solidified its power within the
system of checks and balances in a single decision, Marbury v. Madison.147
Marbury announced the Court’s power of judicial review and gave the Court the
ability to void any congressional law it deemed unconstitutional.148 While the
power of judicial review is an impressive tool, it reflects a strange situation. How
can an unelected Supreme Court have the ability to overrule the decisions of the
elected officials in Congress? This situation, labeled the “counter-majoritarian
Difficulty” by Alexander Bickel,149 has been the source of much academic debate
over the years.150
However, according to Epstein, Knight, and Martin, the American people need
not worry about the counter-majoritarian difficulty too much.151 Despite the fact
that Justices are primarily “single-minded seekers of legal policy,”152 the separation

147. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
148. See id.
149. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962). Bickel used the phrase “counter-majoritarian difficulty”
to describe the contention that judicial review is improper because unelected judges have the
power to overrule elected representatives, which, by its nature, is counter to majority will.
See id.
150. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373 (1998); Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 333 (1998); Illya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A
New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287
(2004).
151. Epstein et al., supra note 142, at 584–85.
152. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 10 (1998) (internal
citations omitted).
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of powers system mandated by the Constitution limits the Court’s ability to blindly
pursue individual policy and institutional goals.153 Instead, the Court has a strategic
incentive to anticipate the preferences of elected officials and the American public
and to react in a way that best ensures a “long-term effect on the nature and content
of the law.”154 The idea is simple. Although the Court interprets the law and has the
power to strike down any law Congress may pass, Congress will always have the
ability to pass new legislation, which the President can either sign or veto.155
Professor William Eskridge has named this interplay between the three branches
the “Judicial Review Game.”156 Specifically, Article I, Section 7 requires bicameral
approval and presentment to the President before a bill becomes law; Article II
prohibits Congress from having a role in the law’s enforcement; and Article III
creates an independent judiciary, the Supreme Court, “to mitigate unjust and partial
lawmaking.”157
Figure 2: The Judicial Review Game

Congress enacts
statute that
President signs

Æ

Statute is
implemented by
agency

Æ

Judicial review

Æ

Possible
override by
Congress

Consequently, strategic Supreme Court justices are not likely to vote their
sincere preferences on an issue if those preferences are not in line with Congress or
the President.158 Rather, the Court would see not only that Congress and the
President could override its position but most likely would if given the
opportunity.159 Instead, the Court rationally chooses to stay at what Epstein,
Knight, and Martin call the “indifference point”—the closest point to the Court’s
ideal policy position without risking congressional reaction.160 Eskridge contends

153. Epstein et al., supra note 142, at 585.
154. Id. at 585.
155. Id. at 592.
156. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Judicial Review Game, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 382, 384
(1993).
157. Id.; see also infra Figure 2. Figure 2 was adapted from Eskridge’s own figure and
illustrates the basic idea of the “judicial review game.” Eskridge, supra note 156, at 385.
158. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 152, at 12–17.
159. Epstein et al., supra note 142, at 594.
160. Id. Note that “congressional reaction” can refer to two different situations. Congress
always has the ability to pass new legislation to bypass a Court decision declaring old
legislation unconstitutional. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Congress also has the ability to
override the Court through constitutional amendment, see U.S. CONST. art. V, which is much
more difficult. This Note suggests that the Supreme Court would have affirmed Cook had it
accepted review. By choosing not to review Cook at all, the Court essentially allowed DADT
to remain in place for an additional year and a half. Assuming, arguendo, that the Court
would have affirmed Cook, Congress might have moved to repeal DADT much sooner.
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that this choice is the obvious consequence of the judicial review game.161 What is
not an obvious consequence of the judicial review game is that a rational Court can
and will employ a variety of tools to pursue its policy preferences.162 One such tool
is the decision to grant or deny certiorari in the first place.
Since the Judiciary Act of 1925, the Supreme Court has been the “master of its
domain” and has had sole discretion over its docket.163 In a typical year, the Court
receives thousands of petitions for review; however, it decides to hear fewer than
5%.164 The Court’s power to set its own agenda should not be understated. The
certiorari process is more than a tool to limit the Court’s caseload to a reasonable
number. Rather, the ability to grant review to a case or not gives the Court the
ability to “bypass” any given controversy,165 raise the salience of a political
issue,166 or even lower it.167 Arguably, deciding not to decide is “among the most
important things done by the Supreme Court.”168
The Court’s agenda-setting power is only getting bigger. In what scholars have
dubbed the “incredible shrinking docket,”169 the Court is taking on fewer cases than
ever before. From 1985 to 2004, the number of opinions issued by the Supreme
Court shrunk from 161 to 85.170 The result, according to former D.C. Circuit judge,
Kenneth Starr, is less clarity in the law.171 Unlike the Warren Court, whose decision
in Brown v. Board of Education, for example, “reshap[ed] society’s institutions,”172
the modern Supreme Court prefers to wait on public opinion and have the “last
word” on divisive issues.173 This measured and reflective approach, Starr suggests,
embodies a “flexible, case-by-case approach to constitutional interpretation” that is
completely unpredictable.174 In 2009, the Court heard arguments in a mere
ninety-two cases.175 Cook v. Gates was not one of them.176 Although not instantly

161. Eskridge, supra note 156, at 387.
162. See id.
163. Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of
William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2006); see also Margaret Meriwether
Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations
in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 389, 392 (2004).
164. See PERRY, supra note 37, at 235.
165. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 163, at 389.
166. See id. at 452.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 390 (internal citations omitted).
169. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Incredible Shrinking Docket, TRIAL MAG., No. 43, Mar.
2007, at 64; see also Adam Liptak, Justices Opt for Fewer Cases, and Professors and
Lawyers Ponder Why, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at A18.
170. See Starr, supra note 163, at 1369.
171. Id. at 1378–82.
172. Id. at 1379.
173. Id. at 1378.
174. Id. at 1382.
175. 2009 Term Opinions of the Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinions.aspx?Term=09. Compare 2009 with
1926, the year following the Judiciary Act of 1925, when the Court issued 223 opinions.
Starr, supra note 163, at 1369.
176. See 2009 Term Opinions of the Court, supra note 175.
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obvious, Starr’s argument fits in nicely with the story of DADT and the Court’s
strategic decision.
B. The DADT Game
1. The Inevitable Repeal of DADT
By 2009, the repeal of DADT was unavoidable. Former President Clinton’s
promise of a “live-and-let-live” policy177 was, in fact, misleading.178 DADT was the
only federal law that permitted the outright firing of U.S. citizens on the basis of
sexual orientation.179 The policy had led to the discharge of more than 13,000 men
and women since 1993,180 sending home valuable, much-needed military personnel
in times of war. Moreover, discharge under DADT resulted in devastating personal
and professional consequences181 and, from an economic perspective, cost the
government a lot of money: the average annual cost from 1994–2003 just to recruit
replacements for those discharged under DADT was $95 million a year.182 Perhaps
the strongest argument in favor of abolishing DADT, however, was the time of war
paradox. If gay and lesbian soldiers were supposedly weak, untrustworthy, and a
detriment to unit cohesion, why did the military retain them at higher rates during
times of war?183
The presidential election in 2008 brought DADT to the forefront of the public’s
eye once again. By that time, both the American public184 and military officials185
had warmed to the idea of ending the discriminatory policy. The candidates were
split along party lines—Republican John McCain adamantly opposed repeal, while
Democrat Barack Obama was strongly in favor.186 With Obama’s decisive victory
in November 2008,187 the legislative repeal of DADT became inevitable.

177. Alexander, supra note 10, at 410.
178. Correales, supra note 12, at 423.
179. Hecht, supra note 10, at 46.
180. Bryan Bender, Continued Discharges Anger ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Critics:
Gay-Rights Groups Urge Reversal Now, BOS. GLOBE, May 20, 2009,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/05/20/continued_discharges_a
nger_dont_ask_dont_tell_critics/.
181. See Correales, supra note 12, at 415 (“For many gay service members, the price of
serving in the military imposed by the policy is a life of deception, where the only way to
survive is by passing as heterosexual twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, whether
on or off military bases.”).
182. Id. at 431.
183. Gustavo Oliveira, Note, Cook v. Gates and Witt v. Department of the Air Force:
Judicial Deference and the Future of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 397, 398
(2009).
184. See Bumiller, supra note 140, at A14.
185. See RODGERS, supra note 141, at 20.
186. See Robin Toner, For ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ Split on Party Lines, N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 2007, at A1. Like other Republicans, one of McCain’s primary arguments against
repealing DADT in 2008 was the War in Iraq. See id. (indicating that not one of the
Republican candidates in 2008 supported gays and lesbians serving openly in the military).
187. See Nagourney, supra note 143, at A1.
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2. The Court’s Strategic Decision
By the time the petition for certiorari in Cook v. Gates reached the Court in
2009, the Court was in a unique position. Clearly the legislative repeal of DADT
was just a matter of time.188 However, the central issue raised in Cook— whether
Lawrence recognized a fundamental right to private sexual intimacy189—was still a
highly controversial issue.190 The Court had already demonstrated its unwillingness
to revisit Lawrence v. Texas in 2005 when it refused to consider Florida’s gay
adoption statute and Alabama’s sex toy ban.191 By denying certiorari in Cook over
four years later,192 the Court seemed to indicate that not much had changed.
A brief look at the composition of the Supreme Court in 2009 may be one
explanation about why the Court passed on Cook. Recall Epstein and Knight’s
argument that Justices are “single-minded seekers of legal policy.”193 On this view,
the decision a Justice makes in a single case should reflect his or her most preferred
policy goal.194 In June 2009, five of the six Justices in the Lawrence majority
remained on the Court—Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens.195 While
Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens presumably would have voted in favor of
extending Lawrence and repealing DADT, Justice Kennedy had gone to great
lengths to limit the scope of Lawrence.196 A decision on DADT could not occur
without either limiting or expanding the central holding in Lawrence,197 and Justice
Kennedy’s opinion had suggested that expansion was not an option. Moreover, in
the years following Lawrence, two strong conservative voices came to the Court.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined the Supreme Court in 2005 and 2006,
respectively.198 With their presence, the Court moved sharply to the right, reaching

188. See supra Part II.B.1.
189. 528 F.3d 42, 52–53, 56 (1st Cir. 2008).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 61–74, 96–100.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 104–113.
192. Cook, 528 F.3d 42, cert. denied sub nom. Pietrangelo v. Gates, 129 S. Ct.
2763 (2009).
193. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 152, at 10 (internal citations omitted).
194. See text accompanying notes 158–62.
195. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 83–88; see also Klarman, supra note 82, at 450.
The sixth vote, Justice O’Connor, retired from the Court in 2006. See Members of the
Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 195. Like Justice Kennedy, Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence made it quite clear that she was reluctant to expand the scope of
Lawrence. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(indicating that “national security” and “preserving the traditional institution of marriage”
were legitimate state interests and that “other reasons exist to promote the institution of
marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group”).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 115–38.
198. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 195.
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conservative decisions nearly 71% of the time,199 and the 2008 presidential election
made it clear how conservatives viewed the DADT policy.200
Still, composition alone cannot explain the Court’s decision to side-step the
Lawrence question. Like Epstein and Knight suggest, the Court is constrained by
other factors, including Congress, the President, and the American public.201
Another constraint stems from the concept of institutional legitimacy.202 Scholars
have long recognized that the “erosion of public support and institutional
legitimacy has negative consequences for the Court’s power and institutional
integrity.”203 Prior to her nomination to the Court, Justice Ginsburg discussed
institutional legitimacy during a famous lecture criticizing Roe v. Wade: “[J]udges
play an interdependent part in our democracy. They do not alone shape legal
doctrine but . . . participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, and with
the people as well.”204 In a lecture to the D.C. Circuit in 2000, former Chief Justice
Rehnquist seconded Justice Ginsburg’s point, declaring that the Court’s integrity is
“dependent upon the public’s respect for the judiciary.”205 Indeed, the Court has a
strong incentive to be aware of public opinion on controversial issues,206 which
invariably include gay rights.
What happened in the 2010 Iowa election provides a good illustration of what
can happen when a court fails to move cautiously in the area of gay rights. In 2009,
the Iowa Supreme Court unanimously voted in Varnum v. Brien to legalize samesex marriage in Iowa.207 But Varnum was not in line with Iowa public opinion; only
44% of the Iowa population supported gay marriage in 2010.208 On November 2,

199. See Measuring the Conservatism of the Roberts Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/07/25/us/20100725-roberts-graphic.html.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 184–87.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 158–62.
202. See, e.g., Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial
Legitimacy, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 973 (2009).
203. See id. (finding that as public support for the Supreme Court declines, the Court
strikes down fewer laws).
204. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198
(1992). Justice Ginsburg’s main critique of Roe v. Wade was the fact that the Court “invited
no dialogue with legislators” and that because of this, Roe “prolonged divisiveness and
deferred stable settlement of the issue” until Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992), was announced nearly twenty years later. Ginsburg, supra, at 1205–08.
205. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice at the D.C. Circuit
Judicial Conference: Reflection on the History and Future of the Supreme Court of the
United States (June 16, 2000).
206. See Clark, supra note 202, at 973 (indicating that the Court recognizes its limits and
will sometimes exercise “self-restraint for fear of acting without public support”); see also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (where Hamilton called the Court the “least
dangerous branch” and discussed how the Court’s dependence upon the other two branches
of government made it less powerful).
207. 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
208. Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Lax & Justin Phillips, Over Time, a Gay Marriage
Groundswell, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at WK3 (“Among the five states that currently
allow same-sex marriage, Iowa is the outlier. It is the only one of those states where support
falls below half, at 44 percent.”).
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2010, Iowa residents voted to remove three of the Iowa Supreme Court justices
who took part in Varnum in a judicial retention election.209 Public dissatisfaction
with the Varnum decision was clear when supporters of the campaign celebrated
with signs declaring “No Activist Judges.”210 The Iowa Supreme Court was
publicly rebuked because it ruled in favor of same-sex marriage before a majority
of Iowa residents were ready. Such a public rebuke suggests that the Iowa court
seriously miscalculated Iowa public opinion in 2009 and took a misguided step in
the wrong direction. As a result, three justices lost their jobs and Varnum was left
seriously weakened.211
Iowa public opinion on same-sex marriage was reflective of the entire country in
May 2009. While a May 2009 poll indicated that nearly 70% of Americans fully
supported the repeal of DADT,212 only 40% of Americans supported same-sex
marriage at that time.213 57% remained opposed.214 Unlike Varnum, the holding in
Cook had nothing to do with same-sex marriage. However, the First Circuit had
directly interpreted Lawrence, the liberty interest it recognized, and the standard of
review that should apply.215 If the Court had granted certiorari in Cook, it would
have been difficult to avoid Lawrence. Lawrence had already been used by many
state courts as a stepping stone to same-sex marriage.216 Consider again the holding
in Goodridge: “[In Lawrence], the Court affirmed that the core concept of common
human dignity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . precludes government
intrusion into the deeply personal realms of consensual adult expression of
intimacy and one’s choice of an intimate partner.”217 Was the Supreme Court
willing to return to Lawrence and open up such a broad liberty? Was the Court
willing to reject it? Return for a moment to Starr’s argument.218 If the modern
Court prefers to have the last word on the major issues that divide the nation, the
judicial repeal of DADT had to wait. It is true that the Court does not need to worry
about judicial retention elections; Supreme Court Justices have life tenure.
However, the Court is concerned with something bigger: its institutional legitimacy
and integrity.219 The surrounding political climate regarding gay rights was

209. See A. G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2010, at A1.
210. A. G. Sulzberger, In Iowa, Voters Oust Judges Over Marriage Issue, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/03judges.html.
211. See Sulzberger, supra note 209, at A1.
212. See Lymari Morales, Conservatives Shift in Favor of Openly Gay Service Members,
GALLUP (June 5, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/120764/Conservatives-Shift-FavorOpenly-Gay-Service-Members.aspx. According to the poll, 64% of men favored repeal in
2009 compared to 73% of women. Id.
213. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority of Americans Continue to Oppose Gay Marriage,
GALLUP (May 27, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/118378/Majority-AmericansContinue-Oppose-Gay-Marriage.aspx.
214. See id.
215. See Walters, supra note 136, at 65.
216. See supra notes 89–95 and accompanying text.
217. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 171–74.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 202–06.
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anything but settled in 2009, and unlike the Iowa Supreme Court, the Supreme
Court would not move without the support of the American public.
In 2005, Professor Michael Klarman wrote an essay comparing the Lawrence
decision to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.220 Klarman argued that the decision in Lawrence, like Brown, was
merely a reflection of the current social attitude toward criminal prosecution for
private sexual acts and not a “vanguard of a social reform movement.”221 Klarman
pointed out that Brown, intentionally narrow and limited to education, only came
after opinion polls showed that a majority of Americans supported an end to
segregation in schools.222 In fact, when the Court had the post-Brown opportunity
to extend its holding and invalidate antimiscegenation laws as early as 1955, the
Court balked.223 The case was Naim v. Naim.224
After Brown, a Chinese man who was married to a white woman in another state
challenged a Virginia antimiscegenation law as unconstitutional under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.225 Klarman maintains that Naim “was the
last case the Justices wished to see on their docket in 1955,” but the case fell within
the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction at the time.226 The Court decided to simply
remand Naim to the Virginia appellate court, leaving instructions to further remand
the case to the trial court for further factual determinations.227 When the Virginia
court refused to comply with the Court’s instructions, the petitioner again appealed
to the Supreme Court.228 This time, the Court dismissed the case for lacking a
“properly presented federal question.”229 Klarman contends that the Court preferred
“being humiliated” to “further stroking the fires of racial controversy ignited by
Brown.”230 Not until thirteen years after Brown, in Loving v. Virginia,231 would the
Court move to strike down an antimiscegenation law.
The repeal of DADT was inevitable regardless of the Court’s decision to grant
review in Cook or not, but the decision to move forward with Lawrence was not.
By avoiding Cook in 2009, the Court strategically postponed any further judicial
discussion about Lawrence and effectively delayed one possible route to the
judicial recognition of same-sex marriage. Part III considers the consequences of
the Court’s behavior and what the legislative repeal of DADT may mean for the
future of the gay rights movement’s success in the judiciary.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See Klarman, supra note 82.
Id. at 444–45.
Id. at 445–46.
Id at 447.
87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
Id. at 751.
Klarman, supra note 82, at 447.
Naim, 350 U.S. 891.
See Klarman, supra note 82, at 449.
Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956).
Klarman, supra note 82, at 449.
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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III. THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS IN THE JUDICIARY
Despite the legislative repeal of DADT in late 2010, the Supreme Court’s
decision to circumvent the issues raised by a challenge to DADT in 2009 remains
significant for several reasons. First, DADT’s days were limited. By the time the
debate on DADT resurfaced in 2010, DADT had become “a near-perfect issue” for
the gay rights movement.232 Many of DADT’s opponents were gays and lesbians
who had served “valiantly” themselves,233 and the American public was fully
behind an end to the discriminating ban. In fact, a May 2010 Gallup Poll showed
that nearly 70% of Americans supported repeal.234 By December, that percentage
had grown to nearly 77%.235 Moreover, unlike same-sex marriage or
anti-discrimination laws, the legislative repeal of DADT did not embody an official
government endorsement of homosexuality. Rather, repeal merely symbolized the
government’s indifference to homosexuality within the relatively small military
community.236 Lastly, the legislative repeal of DADT took seventeen years to
materialize despite strong and continuous public opposition to DADT throughout
its existence.237 Such a long period of time, according to Professor George
Chauncey, is “not a sign of gay political power but of continuing gay political
weakness.”238
When one looks at the bigger picture, the fall of DADT stands for limited
progress. The biggest issue for gay Americans remains same-sex marriage and all
the federal benefits that come with it, such as Social Security, adoption rights, and
tax benefits.239 In the United States, only six states and the District of Columbia
recognize same-sex marriage.240 Even within these jurisdictions, the federal
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defines marriage as that between one
man and one woman when “determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,” 241
still prevents married same-sex couples from receiving certain federal benefits.242

232. Fahrenthold, supra note 8.
233. See id.
234. See Lymari Morales, In U.S., Broad, Steady Support for Openly Gay Service
Members, GALLUP (May 10, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/127904/Broad-SteadySupport-Openly-Gay-Service-Members.aspx.
235. See Ed O’Keefe & Jon Cohen, Most Back Repealing ‘Don't Ask, Don't Tell,’ Poll
Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/federaleye/2010/12/most_back_repealing_dont_ask_d.html.
236. See Fahrenthold, supra note 8.
237. See id.
238. Id.
239. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, One Battle Finished, Gay Rights Activists Shift Sights, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2010, at A16.
240. Nicholas Confessore, Beyond New York, Gay Marriage Faces Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2011, at A1. Same-sex marriage is now recognized in the District of Columbia and
Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont. See id.
241. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (codified
in scattered sections of 1 and 28 U.S.C.).
242. For example, married persons can obtain considerable tax savings by filing jointly
under section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code, see I.R.S. Publication 17, at 20 (Dec. 8, 2010)
(“You will generally pay more combined tax on separate returns than you would on a joint

820

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 87:795

Furthermore, twenty-nine states have enacted some type of constitutional
restriction or ban on same-sex marriage.243 Other states are still considering adding
one. The Indiana Senate, for example, passed a proposed amendment as recently as
last March, which would amend the state’s constitution to ban same-sex
marriage.244 Another twelve states have enacted some type of statutory restriction
or ban on same-sex marriage.245 A recent development in the Justice Department
has given gay rights activists a new reason to hope for change. Just two months
after announcing that his position on same-sex marriage was “evolving,”246
President Obama instructed the Justice Department to stop defending DOMA.247
The President’s decision came after his administration had spent two years
defending the bill.248 The Department of Justice will continue to enforce DOMA,
however, until a final court decision is made on its constitutionality,249 and
congressional Republicans have pledged to continue to defend DOMA.250 Most
significantly, President Obama faces a difficult congressional climate in the coming
2012 presidential election.
Despite these setbacks, federal courts have continued to apply Lawrence in
favorable decisions for the gay rights movement. In 2010, two decisions were
particularly significant. In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Judge Vaughn Walker struck
down Proposition 8—a voter-approved ban on same-sex marriages in California—
on substantive due process and equal protection grounds.251 Broadly defining the
substantive fundamental right at stake as the “right to marry,”252 Walker’s
memorandum decision included a heading that directly baited the Supreme Court
and Justice Kennedy on Lawrence: “Proposition 8 is unconstitutional because it
denies plaintiffs a fundamental right without a legitimate (much less compelling)
reason.”253 The Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments in Perry last December.254 But
when former California Governor Schwarzenegger and current Governor Jerry
Brown refused to continue to defend Proposition 8, the Ninth Circuit asked the
California Supreme Court to determine whether conservative legal groups fighting
return . . . .”); however, under DOMA, married same-sex couples are unable to take
advantage of these potential savings. See Stolberg, supra note 239, at A16.
243. Confessore, supra note 240, at A1.
244. See Indiana Senate Approves Gay Marriage Amendment, THEINDYCHANNEL (Mar.
29, 2011), http://www.theindychannel.com/politics/27360302/detail.html.
245. Confessore, supra note 240, at A1.
246. Perry Bacon Jr., Obama Says His Views on Same-Sex Marriage Are ‘Evolving,’
POST,
Dec.
23,
2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpWASH.
dyn/content/article/2010/12/23/AR2010122301859.html.
247. See Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Turnabout, U.S. Says Marriage Act
Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at A1.
248. See id.
249. See John Schwartz, After New York, New Look at Defense of Marriage Act, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2011, at A12.
250. See Jennifer Steinhauer, House Republicans Step in to Defend Marriage Act and
Dodge a Party Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, at A16.
251. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
252. See id. at 991.
253. Id. at 994.
254. Jesse McKinley, Panel Hears Same-Sex Marriage Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2010, at A19.
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Perry had standing to continue on.255 The California Supreme Court heard
arguments on the standing issue on September 6, 2011256 and will soon weigh in on
the issue. Still, many expect that the Supreme Court will ultimately resolve the
case.257 In the second decision, Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, handed
down on July 8, 2010, Judge Joseph Tauro struck down section 3 of DOMA as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.258 The First Circuit should hear arguments
in the case this year.259
With Perry and Gill, the Supreme Court will have another opportunity to revisit
its decision in Lawrence. In Cook, the Court was not willing to go there, and the
progression of gay rights in the judiciary seemed poised to return to the state of the
Bowers era.260 Perhaps in Perry or Gill the Court will try to reclaim the title of “an
institution where gay Americans can seek justice.”261
CONCLUSION
Like the opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, Lawrence v. Texas was
consciously written to avoid a controversial issue,262 same-sex marriage. The
Supreme Court has been strategically side-stepping that issue ever since. The story
of DADT and the Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari to Cook v. Gates in
2009 provide an especially telling illustration of the Court’s strategic behavior. In
2005, Professor Klarman remarked:
Five members of this Court are not about to strike down any time soon
bans on same-sex marriage—not when public opinion strongly supports
such laws. Figuring out how the Court in such a case would distinguish
Lawrence is an interesting question. Perhaps the Court would simply
refuse to take such a case . . . .263
Five years later, it is remarkable just how right Klarman was. While the
Supreme Court’s decision to pass on DADT in Cook v. Gates was not about
same-sex marriage, the issue was lurking below the surface. The American public

255. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Jesse McKinley,
California: Judges as for Clarity on Same-Sex Marriage Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011,
at A13.
256. California Supreme Court to Hear Proposition 8 Case Sept. 6, L.A. TIMES, July 28,
2011,
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/07/proposition-8-legal-battle-standingcalifornia-supreme-court.html.
257. See McKinley, supra note 254, at A19.
258. 669 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010).
259. On February 24, 2011, the Obama administration notified the First Circuit of its
decision not to defend DOMA. See Letter of Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, to
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (Feb. 24, 2011), available at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/gill-v-office-of-personnel-management/doj-letter-rema-doma-cases-02-2011.pdf.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 35–54.
261. Leslie, supra note 35, at 219.
262. See Klarman, supra note 82, at 450.
263. Id. at 452 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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was not ready for the Court to take the next step in its substantive due process
protections for gay rights in 2009. Three Iowa justices learned this lesson the hard
way. It took the Supreme Court thirteen years to extend Brown to
antimiscegenation laws.264 So far only eight years have passed since Lawrence.
Professor Tribe was right to call Lawrence the Brown v. Board of Education of the
gay rights movement, but perhaps for the wrong reason. Lawrence, like Brown, was
not a “vanguard of social reform” but a “laggard” waiting complacently on public
opinion.265 The unfortunate consequence of the Court’s idleness is that full
constitutional respect and equal protection under the law for gay Americans must
wait.

264. Notably, although Justice Ginsburg rejected the idea that courts should shape policy
alone, see supra text accompanying note 204, she conceded that Brown v. Board of
Education is one example where the Supreme Court was right to step ahead of other political
branches. See Ginsburg, supra note 204, at 1206. In fairness, Justice Ginsburg quickly
pointed out the holding in Brown was quite limited. See id. at 1207.
265. Klarman, supra note 82, at 440–45.

